Dec. 26, 2024, was a huge day for the global airpower, military technology, and strategy communities. The emergence of not one, but two Chinese advanced tailless tactical combat aircraft sent shockwaves around the globe and garnered very high interest from the public. You can read our initial coverage and preliminary analysis on the appearance of both those aircraft here and here. So, now that the initial news has passed, and with the information space absolutely saturated with poor takes and outlandish claims, I want to unpack in a very comprehensive manner what we have seen in these two aircraft, their broader implications, and what it all means and doesn’t mean.
Known Unknowns And Nebulous Definitions
First off, there is a lot we do not know about these aircraft. We have the benefit of much better imagery of the larger of the two — the one that garnered the most interest. The other may be more ambiguous due to the lack of good imagery, but its existence is important regardless.
We do not know the exact developmental status and goals of either platform. There is something of a scale here we must take into account, from technology demonstrator — a precursor experimental design that is meant to prove a design concept and important underlying components of it — to a developmental prototype that is meant to lead directly to a refined production aircraft. The latter would be based on a more mature design concept.
Both aircraft have never been documented visually in the public domain before, and both are sporting air data booms on their noses, which points to early flight testing. We also only saw the aircraft with chase aircraft behind them and their gear down, which is a precautionary configuration for very early flight tests, although this could also be chalked up to images being taken during terminal operations near the airfield. None of this evidence is conclusive, but it points heavily toward both aircraft taking their first flights on Dec. 26 or close to that date. So it seems probable that at least the emergence of both types comes very early in their flight test evolution. On the other hand, these aircraft could have flown in secret for some time and we are just seeing them now — the less likely scenario.
Exactly what role these aircraft are intended to fulfill is not perfectly clear. They could be competitors for China’s next-generation heavy fighter initiative, one being markedly larger with different performance goals than the other but still looking to fulfill a future tactical airpower vision, with Chengdu as the manufacturer of the heavier example and Shenyang likely the smaller design. This would make some sense based on the timing of their emergence and the fact that they are both tailless next-generation designs in the heavy fighter class, at least generally, with one clearly possessing a much higher gross weight potential than the other. They could also be intended for separate, but related programs. We just don’t know.
China’s next-generation tactical air combat vision is understood to be similar to that of the United States. It would likely include central manned aircraft that will play direct kinetic and non-direct kinetic-enabling roles, serving as independent ‘shooters’ and command and control platforms for drones that possess a high level of autonomy. It will also work as a key intelligence gathering and communications node, as well as a potent electronic warfare platform in its own right. Heavy use of artificial intelligence and digital engineering are also components of this effort, as are the development of new communications architectures, next-generation low-observables (stealth), sensors, and engine technologies.

The term ‘6th generation’ fighter is often thrown around, but that should be viewed as more of a nebulous bucket of capabilities, not a highly specific rubric when it comes to international new generation tactical air combat platforms and ecosystems. Each country or consortium has deviations in ‘6th generation’ requirements based on available resources, technological know-how, and tactical needs of their air arms. There is more overlap than not, but it’s not a static definition. In reality, some of these concepts really aren’t traditional fighters at all, as well have stressed since the emergence of the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. In other words, don’t get hung up on it when discussing and comparing these new aircraft and what the U.S. or any other country may be developing. For those that put a ton of weight on it, think of it as a red flag as it is more marketing and shorthand than a universal threshold of requirements to achieve that branding.
Speaking of requirements, for the larger of the two designs, now being referred to very unofficially by some as the ‘J-36’ due to its serial number and notional fighter designation progression in China (which we will adopt just for convenience), there is particular ambiguity. While China is clearly pursuing a next-generation manned tactical ‘fighter-like’ platform, we also know they are looking to build a ‘regional bomber’ of sorts. TWZ first reported on this program, referred to commonly as the JH-XX, based on U.S. intelligence assessments in 2019. It would sit between a heavy fighter class and China’s upcoming next-generation strategic bomber/cruise missile carrier, the latter referred to as the H-20. Its goal would be to possess a significant combat radius to penetrate far from China’s shores, but not in an intercontinental manner like a full-on stealthy bomber. It would carry a significant payload, but substantially less than a bomber, and be oriented toward multi-role tactical applications, with a very potent strike capability, to go after higher-value targets in what would be a highly contested Indo-Pacific battlespace.
With this in mind, it isn’t clear exactly if the larger of the two new aircraft is meant to satisfy the JH-XX role or the next-generation heavy fighter role, or if it is something of a blend of both, which is very possible. At this time, I think the latter is more likely the case or this is indeed a very heavy next-generation fighter-like concept whose role bleeds into the JH-XX mission set.
Similar to the 6th generation definition issue, putting an aircraft like this into a single bucket is challenging just as an observational exercise, and the reality of how China views it could reflect that. Definitively declaring any new highly advanced platform a ‘bomber’ in 2025 is also an uninformed simplification or just a casual moniker. Just as the B-21 is a multi-role platform, the JH-XX, and even the H-20, would be as well, with the latter’s less traditional capabilities possibly expanding more slowly over time. While fine to use casually, the term ‘bomber’ is now a traditional carry-over that is unrepresentative of what any new long-range, high-end combat aircraft will be capable of.
What We Are Seeing
Now let’s break down in far more detail than our initial analysis, which still aligns with what we lay out below, what we are seeing in the images of these new aircraft.
The Heavy Hitter
Images of the ‘J-36’ are remarkably interesting. They offer quite a bit of detail and some basic assumptions can be made based on them.
Planform: The aircraft features a large modified delta-diamond-winged tailless configuration with prominent leading-edge extensions blending into the nose section seamlessly. Overall, the aircraft appears longer and much wider than the J-20, offering vastly larger internal volume and significantly enhanced low-observability features. The lack of tails, canards, and strakes will greatly enhance the aircraft’s ‘broadband’ stealth capabilities. In other words, it will help decrease the detection range of multiple radar systems operating in different bands, especially from all aspects, not just the frontal quadrant. The tailless design can also significantly enhance efficiency and performance during cruise, but the aircraft will pay a major price for it in terms of agility. This reality was clearly embraced by its designers, opting for better straight-line performance, combat radius, and payload over traditional fighter maneuverability. Considering the potential gross weight of this aircraft and its tailless design, agility by default would be put on a back burner.

Empennage: As we noted in our initial analysis, the trailing edge of the aircraft features no less than 15 individual segmented control surfaces, with split elevons, offering yaw control and air braking, for the outboard sections. This exotic arrangement of control surfaces was likely driven by multiple factors, especially the inherent high-instability of tailless aircraft, and particularly a very high-performance one. Exactly how this flight control surface arrangement impacts the rear-aspect radar cross-section isn’t clear. The control surfaces that sit below the exhausts could potentially be used for semi-thrust vectoring coordination to enhance controllability further, especially enhanced upward pitch response, but that isn’t confirmed at this time.
Fuselage: The semi-blended ventral central fuselage area has some similarities with the J-20, notably its weapons bay configuration. While the aircraft clearly has a very large internal volume, putting a bit of a bias on fuel fraction over magazine depth would be a good assumption. A weapons bay somewhat longer, but far deeper than that found on the J-20 would provide ample space for multiple smaller stores and at least a couple of very large ones. A rotary weapons rack seems questionable, but if it is possible, it would only be advantageous for certain weapons loadouts featuring numerous, smaller munitions. Additional side bays for air-to-air weaponry, as shown by many fan art depictions, may be possible, although there is no clear evidence of them at this time. Regardless, being able to carry at least a couple of very large standoff weapons would be a critical capability for this aircraft, and doing so would allow it to adapt in the future to increasingly threatening air defenses.
Intakes: This is one of the aircraft’s most intriguing and possibly telling features. The J-36 features a unique three-engine layout, with two intakes mounted on the bottom of the aircraft and one prominently mounted dorsally. These intakes feed three separate engines mounted in a row at the rear. The inlets themselves do not look highly advanced and appear to be similar to the technology found on the F-22 and F-35, with the lower intakes leveraging a similar gapped/splitter design found on the F-22 to manage turbulent boundary layer airflow, and the top seeming to feature a diverterless supersonic intake (DSI), as found on the F-35, as well as the J-20 and J-35, which uses a bulged fixed shape to provide a steady stream of stable, subsonic air into the engine. Inlet design is one of the most challenging aspects of realizing an effective stealth aircraft. The possible use of two separate inlet configurations to achieve a desired outcome is curious and could result in unequal total raw thrust output among the engines during different areas of the performance envelope.

The intake duct routing is also of interest as this is critical to minimizing radar return via the use of serpentine ducts to keep radar reflections, namely those emanating from the engine fan faces, from occurring. Three ducts take up a lot more precious internal volume over two and an extra inlet adds weight and drag. This points to high-performance goals and/or deficiencies in China’s quickly improving, but still playing catch-up, jet engine know-how, with the need to use three engines versus two in order to achieve performance goals. Three engines also would, in most cases, consume more gas, although it’s possible the central engine could be shut down or idled when the aircraft is operating in mundane areas of its performance envelope.
There are also potential benefits of three engines beyond more thrust. Three engines paired with a lot of internal volume could be extremely important for supporting electricity generation, which would be a major element in a next-generation aircraft like this, allowing it to power advanced and electricity-hungry emitters/sensors, communications, cooling, flight control systems, and future capabilities like directed energy weapons.
Exhaust: The J-36’s exhaust configuration is also very interesting as it appears to feature a similar arrangement as the YF-23, with exhaust trenches sitting inward of the tailing edge, paired with a lower planar shelf-like arrangement terminating at the upper trailing edge. This is a clear low-observable play both for radar and infrared signature management. Recessing the engine exhaust before the aircraft’s upper trailing edge is a classic low-observable design element that Northrop largely pioneered with Tacit Blue, B-2 Spirit, and YF-23. The ejected exhaust is spread out and has the potential to be actively cooled by this upper deck area. Above all else, this provides very limited line-of-sight to the engine exhausts themselves, which helps significantly in minimizing infrared signature, as well as radar cross-section, from most aspects.

Low observables: Overall, beyond the intakes, exhausts, and general planform, we see serrated gear doors, hard angles, and a limited number of them at that, as well as some of the normal low-observable design tactics that are now familiar to China. The aircraft’s basic LO design does not look groundbreaking or a generational leap ahead of where the United States has already been in the past, beyond its tailless configuration, but by its very nature it is more advanced than anything manned we have seen come out of China. Even if this is a more mature prototype aircraft and not a demonstrator, it is absolutely common for the first iteration to have less refined LO treatment than the pre-production and production versions. This has been the case with fighters and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) nearly across the board, including with Chinese aircraft. So keep this in mind — a production aircraft would be substantially more refined.

Landing gear: The gear arrangement on this aircraft is an instant indication of just how heavy it is. Instead of the single-wheel main landing gear, we see two tandem wheels on each gear. Adding this feature increases weight and complexity, and gives up internal volume, but it would be critical for the high gross weight of such an aircraft. We see a similar arrangement on the MiG-31 Foxhound and Su-34 Fullback for instance, which have a gross weight approaching 100,000 pounds. A two-wheeled nose gear is also present. Just how heavy this aircraft is remains unclear, but I would guess well over 100,000 pounds full gross, possibly approaching 115,000 pounds, based on what we are seeing and the fact that three engines are being used.
Canopy: This component is something of a mystery. It is hard to make out any details of it, but one photo, although clearly enhanced using computer algorithms, looks very wide and no frame bows are clearly visible. Considering how broad the front fuselage is, it could potentially feature a side-by-side crew arrangement, which would be beneficial for crew resource management, but may have a real impact on the aircraft’s radar signature from the critical forward aspect. This is just a possibility and is in no way definitive. A tandem cockpit/standard canopy arrangement could also be the case. We also don’t know how many crew the aircraft will have, but two would seem to be necessary for the aircraft’s potential mission sets.

Sensors: While we can only guess at what sensor capabilities China would want on this aircraft, two features point directly to intended or present systems. First are the two large antenna apertures on either side of the aircraft’s nose. These look exactly like sideways-looking aerial radar (SLAR) array apertures. Three arrays, one on each side of the nose, paired with a traditional array in the front of the nose, would provide greatly expanded radar coverage around the aircraft and allow for higher capacity to execute multiple array taskings simultaneously, including executing different radar modes, electronic attack, and communications functions. You can read more about how common AESA array technologies will be integrated into next-generation combat aircraft here. Just the width of the nose of the aircraft could contain an absolutely massive AESA. With the help of high power generation, an airborne fighter-like radar with that big of aperture could be very capable as a sensor and an electronic warfare weapon.
On the surveillance side, a high-flying J-36 would be able to track aircraft, take detailed perpendicular synthetic aperture radar maps, and acquire ground moving target indicator (GMTI) and ship tracking data of target areas all around the aircraft, with just a blind spot to the rear (roughly 270 degree coverage). This includes collecting data while flying parallel to said target area. These are key capabilities as the aircraft could peer into highly denied territory for a prolonged period of time without penetrating into it or at least into extreme threat areas. In the air-to-air combat arena, SLARs allow the aircraft to ‘beam,’ or hide in the doppler notch of enemy aircraft radars and missiles, while still maintaining situational awareness via radar and, most importantly, guiding its own missiles to their targets. This would enhance survivability and help overcome any low-observable deficiencies. The Su-57 Felon has a similar arrangement to employ these tactics, which you can read about here. The F-22A was slated to get SLARs, as well, but they were cut relatively far along in its development cycle due to budget. Other solutions, like putting a fighter’s nose-mounted fire control radar on a swashplate or repositioned have allowed for similar capabilities, but having fixed, staring arrays is hugely beneficial.
The inclusion of SLARs also allows for the J-36’s near spherical radar coverage to be leveraged by other aircraft it is networked with, especially collaborative drones. It can even work as something of a ‘mini awacs’ operating forward of less capable manned fighter aircraft and providing targeting data for their missiles while inside higher threat areas.

We also see what appear to be two relatively large electro-optical apertures on either side of the nose. This is a very interesting feature as any kind of distributed aperture system should not require anywhere near that large of windows. This points to the aircraft being intended to pack powerful electro-optical and infrared sensors that, like the SLARs, can peer to either side of the aircraft and deep into heavy-threat areas. They could also work to augment the aircraft’s forward-looking infrared search and track (IRST) capabilities — a critical way to detect, track, and engage even stealthy targets passively — although we still don’t know if a primary, forward-view IRST is fitted at this time. We also don’t even see an electro-optical target system, so the inclusion of these large side apertures so early in development is quite interesting and points to the aircraft’s intended high-end surveillance and situational awareness capabilities.
This aircraft, at least an operational version of it, would pack other critical sensors, including advanced passive radio frequency ones, as well as highly capable electronic warfare and communications/networking systems. Large conformal load-bearing antenna structures are also probably a component, but we are limiting this analysis to what we can see visually at this time.
Performance: The three-engine layout certainly points to a high-speed capability, but China’s ability to make engines that could result in a less complicated, longer-ranged, higher-internal volume twin-engine design could certainly be another factor in choosing tri-jet configuration. As noted earlier, power generation is also likely to be a significant design driver here.
I think it’s safe to say that China is looking for a long-range aircraft capable of sustaining supercruise (fly greater than Mach 1 without the use of afterburner) for longer than any other aircraft currently disclosed. This would provide the option for faster transits to target areas as well as increase the aircraft’s survivability and tactical flexibility once approaching and inside a high-threat area. For longer-range missions, the aircraft can fly subsonically aside from a supercruise dash into its target area and out, if needed. If China can perfect ‘advanced cycle’ turbofans for this application, the capability will only increase. With this in mind, the aircraft could fly now with an existing engine type and be fitted with a more advanced engines in the future or in follow-on iterations of the aircraft to realize its fully proposed potential. We just don’t know what engines are installed now.
Also, it’s worth mentioning that the supercruise we are referring to is between Mach 1 and Mach 2 (and likely well under the latter number), not higher Mach numbers. Resiliency of delicate observable coatings and other thermal factors are major issues when sustaining supersonic speed for a prolonged time. Still, even extended duration supercruise well below Mach 1.5 would be a major capability to have.
Operating altitude is also likely a major design driver here. Flying above 50,000 feet, and potentially just over 60,000 feet, where the F-22 currently finds many advantages, would very likely be a major goal. This would allow for the J-36’s weapons to fly farther while achieving superior end-game kinematics. It would also make the best out of the aircraft’s advanced sensor suite by increasing line-of-sight. Considering we are seeing both SLARs and large EO/IR apertures on each side of its nose, the higher it goes the farther it can peer into highly contested territory while flying parallel to it. High-altitude performance will also allow it to make the best use of its low-observable engine exhaust design and mitigate weaknesses in its upper fuselage signature, such as its large inlet and possibly its large canopy configuration, with most fixed-wing enemy aircraft packed with sensors flying well below it. High-altitude operations can also improve fuel efficiency even further.

A very large combat radius is clearly a top goal with this aircraft. Its ample fuel volume would be leveraged for extended unrefueled range and loitering endurance once on station. China’s lack of tanker resources would also be a driver here, as well as the survivability of the tankers it has when operating closer to enemy forces. A combat radius upwards of 1,500 miles would be highly beneficial, with 2,000 miles being extremely attractive considering the Western Pacific map. Those figures would also allow for direct pairing with the enhanced ranges increasingly offered by unmanned combat air vehicles and collaborative combat aircraft that will surely be a key enabler of this aircraft’s concept of tactical operations.

Overall, the J-36 most logically combines a lot of very important features in a relatively advanced design — one potentially capable of executing long-range counter-air, ground and anti-surface strike, SEAD/DEAD roles, as well as offering a very potent standoff surveillance capability and working as a drone controller and networking hub. As we originally stated in our initial analysis, its range, speed, and payload could put many enemy assets at risk, from surface combatants to support aircraft, and especially vulnerable tankers even while operating far from China’s shores. Dismantling the ‘tanker bridge’ that would be critical to enabling U.S. tactical airpower in an anti-access combat environment, the same tanker bridge that supports America’s notoriously short-ranged fighter aircraft, would be devastating and this aircraft appears built to find, fix and kill these aircraft, among other roles.
Overall, this package of design elements, when taken at face value, appears to be tailored to pushing out tactical airpower far from Chinese shores, including to the edges of the second island chain. If fielded in relevant numbers in a truly effective state, it could have major consequences for Beijing’s foes, namely the United States.
The ‘other’ jet
As we noted earlier, less can be gleaned from images of the smaller of the two aircraft, most likely built by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, but some key observations are worth talking about.
First off, this is not a small aircraft. Yes, it is clearly smaller overall than the ‘J-36,’ but it still appears to be in the heavy fighter class, although more in the intermediate end of the heavy spectrum.

The airframe shaping and overall design appear to be just as advanced as its larger counterpart, but this is just a superficial take. The large rhombus-shaped inlets, in particular, are loosely reminiscent of those found on the J-20. While they are most likely DSI-type, more recent shots of the aircraft show a deep indentation running down its ventral centerline beginning where the inlets ‘meet’ behind the nose. This could indicate the inlets are separated from the fuselage, but it’s too hard to tell for sure.
That crease is of great interest as it would appear to run down the entire lower fuselage from the inlets to the engine exhausts. This would appear to necessitate two separate weapons bays, not a large continuous one like what’s found on the J-20 and F-22. This big channel seems like an odd design feature for an aircraft with clear low-observable design aspirations.
Overall, the higher-set wing and more pronounced, slab-sided ventral fuselage area is reminiscent of the F-22 and J-20, and it gives the aircraft a thicker look than the more blended fuselage found on the J-36.

The aircraft’s nose has a ‘shovel’-like shape, similar to the YF-23 and the lower nose cross-section is a large half-diamond shape with a joining ridge along the bottom.
The high/mid-set wing appears to be akin to a modified ‘lambda’ design and the aircraft features no tails. Similar planforms have appeared in U.S. concepts dating back decades. There has been widespread speculation and outright claims that this aircraft features maneuvering tailplanes that sits flush with the inner wing area, basically allowing it to activate huge flight control surfaces similar to ‘ruddervons’ when needed. A similar concept has been touted in fan art of the H-20 bomber, with the tails angling upwards during slow flight to add stability. We see no evidence this is the case. In fact, everything points to this having flight controls along its trailing edge, as expected, not massive control surfaces that can unlock and break with the wing’s plane. Such a feature would also add weight and complexity and decrease fuel volume, which seems antithetical to the design’s likely objectives.
The graphic renders are fan art showing one interpretation of what we discuss above:
We can see at least three major control surfaces per wing and there is some speculation that the outer wing sections may act as moving control surfaces and/or are ‘drooped.” We just don’t know if that is the case but in the images we have they do look interesting.

This aircraft features two engines instead of the J-36’s three, with what appear to be 2D nozzles very similar to the F-22. This points to thrust vectoring, which would be very useful for enhancing maneuverability and stability considering its heavy, tailless design. The nozzles would also help with signature reduction, but less so than those found on the J-36.
The aircraft features single axle main landing gear, with one wheel per side, pointing to the lower gross weight than the J-36. Still, the aircraft can be quite heavy. The F-15E has a maximum takeoff weight of just over 80,000lbs and the F-14 nearly that at around 75,000 pounds, so two wheels can still support a very heavy fighter, but up into the 100,000+ pound class, such as what is found on Su-34 and MiG-31, two wheels per side are common.
The upper portion of the aircraft remains an unknown, including its canopy design. In fact, some have speculated that it may not even be manned. This could be the case, but we see no evidence that points to that, either, beyond the lack of clear pictures of the canopy and upper nose section.

Overall, this second aircraft appears to be more akin to a multi-role air dominance fighter aircraft — similar to notional concepts teased by U.S. defense contractors — than the very heavy, long-range design seen in the J-36. This aircraft is still likely larger overall than the J-20 and more efficient with a much lower overall signature. Its size, combined with two engines, would still give it a substantial combat radius likely well in excess of the J-20 and potentially the ability to supercruise for extended periods with the right powerplants. This would not be a super-maneuverable fighter, it would feature a balanced capability set that puts more emphasis on exploiting low observable technologies and airframe efficiency, although it would still provide enough agility to not be a massive deficiency, especially if indeed thrust vectoring is included in the design.
As we addressed earlier, the relationship between these two aircraft remains unknown, but at the very least they would be highly complementary, if they are not directly competing visions for the future of China’s high-end manned tactical combat aircraft.
The ‘Versus’ Pitfall
One of the most common responses from people when these aircraft first emerged was that they were no big deal because the United States has something better and has been test-flying it for years. I think both claims are true, although that assumption does not in any way negate what China has accomplished here or its potential implications. Arguing fighter versus fighter is a silly way to look at air combat in the 21st Century, and always a red flag when it comes to analysis anyways.
Yes, the U.S. military has flown at least one, and very likely multiple advanced demonstrator aircraft to prove various technologies and concepts in recent years that were a precursor to and the direct result of the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) initiative. The roots of the program date back at least a decade, before the NGAD demonstrator aircraft. I think it is safe to say that the latest versions of these aircraft would be significantly superior in terms of all their core elements, especially low observables and engine design. Subsystem technologies, including sensors and communications, and more, are also likely to be ahead of their Chinese counterparts. As is the ability to integrate all these elements together and fuse their combined capabilities into a single usable package, one that can fold into a highly networked joint force operation.

With that being said, we don’t know how these elements were all balanced into demonstrator airframes. We also don’t how they would be integrated together in the future in a more mature American ‘6th generation fighter.’ Neither does the USAF it seems. Yes, efficient supercruise and high altitude capability, as well as a large combat radius, all packed in a very low-observable tailless design certainly seemed like they would be key elements of this future aircraft. So did this aircraft being the centerpiece in a family of systems that leverages new weapons, communications, command and control, and engine technologies, as well as other aircraft, namely drones. But all this is very much ‘up in the air’ now as the USAF put the program on hold to reevaluate its requirements and costs — in particular whether it could afford it at all. Now the Biden Administration has punted the decision of the path forward for NGAD to the Trump administration.
Moving away from a heavy, long-range tactical jet to something smaller, less capable and far less costly could happen, as competing priorities crush the USAF’s budget. The Air Force could even skip a new manned tactical aircraft altogether and focus on existing aircraft, like the F-35 and the B-21, that could assume some of a next-generation fighter’s role while leaping more quickly and deeply into the uncrewed space. There are multiple options on the table.
Regardless of America’s plans for its own future high-end manned tactical jet, the emergence of these Chinese aircraft is an important moment and either of them existing one day in an operational form could be a problem for potential foes, including the United States and its allies. Just because something may not be as advanced as something else, at least in some ways, does not mean it should be discounted as irrelevant or ‘junk.’ An operational J-36 would be a challenge to deal with even if America’s NGAD solution is superior in almost all respects. The Pacific is a huge battlespace and this aircraft would take advantage of that reality. Protecting all assets — in the air, on the ground, and at sea — with high-end defenses, especially 6th generation fighters, or any fighters for that matter, will be impossible. Ground and sea-based air defenses have their own vulnerabilities and major capacity limitations too.
Above all else, the J-36 and this other tailless fighter are remarkable engineering achievements for China at a time when clearly the momentum of quick technological progress appears to be building on Beijing’s side. This is especially true in the advanced air combat domain. Discounting these aircraft because the U.S. probably has something better that has been secretly flight-tested shows an outright lack of understanding of modern warfare and the avalanche of factors that would be at play in a fight in the Pacific.

This leads to a somewhat obscure but important issue I have persistently highlighted for years. There is this perception that just because something very advanced exists in a developmental state in the classified realm, or even in a semi-operational one in very small numbers, that it somehow grants dominance on the actual battlefield. This couldn’t be farther from reality.
Actual operational iron on the ramp in relevant quantities to sustain combat operations is what will matter in a future air fight in the Pacific, not what has been experimented with in tiny numbers out in the desert under a thick cloak of secrecy. Beyond a very limited ‘silver bullet’ capability, you need combat mass to make an impact, and this has never been more true in recent decades than when facing a foe like China, where the target sets even in a more limited conflict will be in the tens of thousands and many will lie beneath very dangerous airspace.
So the race to field an operational capability and in significant numbers really matters here, not just technological supremecy. The U.S. military may have a far better ‘J-36’ waiting in the wings, but if it remains in developmental purgatory forever, it doesn’t really matter. And by matter, I mean to the total force, not in a J-36 vs U.S. NGAD fighter fantasy head-to-head match-up. The aircraft alone is one small part of a huge ecosystem that would enable a victor in such a scenario and that scenario would have many, many variables. Everything from advanced networking, to autonomous drones, to exotic space-based capabilities, and so much more will play a key part. Facing off future air dominance ecosystems would be a better comparison, but that too is not really relevant in a vacuum. And just because the brochure says something, if any hard info becomes available on these aircraft sometime in the nearer term, it doesn’t mean it’s reality. All the components have to work together, on the aircraft and connected to it, and humans have to maintain and operate it, or at least program the AI agents to do so, in some cases. The quality and experience of the pilot, programmer, maintainer, supply chain manager, intelligence officer and everyone in between matters.
Another critical factor is numerical superiority, which gets very complex when talking about next generation tactical airpower ecosystems. But 300 of a 70% next generation fighter solution that may be more detectable a bit farther away and isn’t as capable in most respects would likely be of greater utility over 100 of its more advanced 100% solution counterpart, when fighting in the vastness of the Pacific. Comparative deficiencies in one element of the ecosystem can also be made up by enhancing other elements in both capability and capacity, as well. Collaborative drones and the right tactics to employ them are a shining example of this.
I could go on and on here, but suffice it to say the ‘fighter versus fighter, which is better?’ debate is silly and not representative of the reality we live in today, let alone the one we are heading into tomorrow.

And yes, these two aircraft are what China wants to show us. You can look at that as a play to push America’s hand in the development of the wrong systems or as a bold warning designed for domestic and international consumption — a rattle of the technological saber in the face of the world’s most powerful military. And yes, there are many other things China has not and does not intend to show us at this time. We are only seeing part of the puzzle and a small part of it — the one they want us to see.
So, when you look at the total picture, to blow off China’s achievements with these new aircraft — and considering they are clear indicators of where they could be headed for future air combat capabilities — is a naive and dangerous act. While the U.S. remains superior in most all technological aspects of tactical combat aviation, there is no denying that with each year China closes what was once a gaping technological gap. If anything else, the evidence presented in the form of these two aircraft underlines that fact and should be a cause for real concern and reflection as a result.
Official Reactions
For its part, “the Air Force has been closely monitoring China’s ongoing military modernization efforts,” a service official told TWZ on Dec. 26 in response to queries relating to the new Chinese stealth aircraft. “This development is consistent with our understanding of China’s strategic objectives and long-term force planning. Their new weapons systems introduce additional complexity in the PLA, which requires highly skilled personnel to actually employ them to the max extent of their capability.”
The Pentagon’s most recent annual report on Chinese military and security developments, an unclassified version of which was released last month, notably does not explicitly mention any 6th generation combat jet programs. It does however reiterate the position that “the PLAAF [People’s Liberation Army Air Force] is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets,” referring to the JH-XX and the H-20, respectively. The report also says China is likely to expand its ability to produce more capable jet engines in the coming decade and, as a result, “very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps.”
“China’s ambitious drive to develop 6th-generation fighter aircraft underscores its determination to achieve technological dominance in military aviation. Reports suggest that China is making rapid strides in designing next-generation stealth fighters, integrating cutting-edge capabilities like artificial intelligence, hypersonic speeds, advanced sensors, and drone swarming technologies,” Efrain Garcia wrote on Linkedin, where he describes himself as currently a “Manager of Intelligence Analysis” with an unspecified unit at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, last weekend. “These developments, if realized, could pose a significant challenge to U.S. air superiority and tilt the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.”

Garcia’s profile says he was previously “Superintendent, Wing Intelligence” with the 552nd Operations Support Squadron, part of the 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. The 552nd is the Air Force’s main E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) unit.
“The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aims to outpace competitors by leveraging China’s centralized industrial policies and massive investments in research and development,” Garcia also wrote. “China’s ability to field advanced systems quickly is evidenced by its swift progression from the J-20 stealth fighter to the conceptual designs of 6th-generation platforms. A successful deployment of these aircraft would enhance China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, complicating U.S. efforts to project power in critical regions like the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.”
“For the United States, maintaining technological superiority is not just a matter of prestige but a strategic imperative,” he added. “The U.S. must accelerate its own 6th-generation fighter programs, such as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) initiative, to ensure dominance in future conflicts. This requires robust funding, streamlined acquisition processes, and fostering innovation within the defense industry. Collaboration with allies is also critical to counterbalance China’s advancements.”
As we touched on a bit earlier, the USAF’s own initiative for a similar aircraft concept is currently in purgatory. A major review of Air Force plans for the crewed 6th generation combat jet as part of the larger NGAD effort is in its final stages, if not now complete. However, any decisions about how to proceed based on the conclusions will have to wait until Donald Trump begins his second term as president.

“We are the smallest and oldest that we have ever been,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Doug Wickert, currently head of the 412th Test Wing at Edwards Air Force Base in California, said during a briefing for members of his unit on Jan. 6. “The PLA is the largest and most modern that it has even [sic; ever] been. That is risk. That is uncertainty.”
Wickert also described PLA modernization efforts across the board as “unprecedented and far outpacing” unspecified efforts in the United States. “And that’s why what we are doing here at Edwards Air Force Base is so very important, because we are developing and modernizing and doing those things that will change [Chinese] Chairman Xi [Jinping]’s calculus …. We cannot afford to have to take a step backward because we have a mishap.”
An official news item on Wickert’s briefing does not explicitly mention the NGAD combat jet or China’s recent stealth combat jet developments. It does say that the head of the Air Force’s top flight testing unit highlighted the importance of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber.

“It’s fair to say we pay a lot of attention to what the Chinese are doing. And so, not everything that becomes public is a shock,” Andrew Hunter, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, said in an interview with Breaking Defense that was published on Jan. 13. “But having said that, their pace is incredibly fast.”
“So [the] IOC [initial operational capability] date on something, they may well beat us on that. I think we’ll have the better capability, but we certainly have no time to lose,” Hunter added. “They could beat us to the punch.”
Hunter further described the U.S. military as now being in a “race” with China when it comes to 6th generation air combat capability, but stressed that the Air Force’s “technical advantage” remains “meaningful and that our system is producing good materiel.”
“Given the pace at which China, in particular, is modernizing, we need to get our heads in the game,” outgoing Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said during a separate talk that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank hosted on Jan. 13. “I think, to a large extent, we have.”

“I’ve been watching China modernize their military for quite a while,” Kendall had also told Air & Space Forces Magazine in an interview published on Jan. 7. “They’re working aggressively to build a military designed to keep the U.S. out of the Western Pacific, and I think, over time, they have more ambitions than even that.
“They’ve already shown that they’re going to modernize their strategic forces and dramatically increase their inventory of nuclear weapons. And in space, they’re doing similar things, right? They’re really militarizing space at a high rate,” he continued. “So that was already baked into all the things we were thinking about, and the arrival of those … airplanes, visible to the public, hasn’t really changed that.”
Kendall added that, when it comes to his service, there is “a consensus that there are a number of other things that we need to fund,” but that it “would still be beneficial to have an NGAD-like aircraft” if sufficient resources are made available. The Air Force’s vision of what air superiority will entail and what the entire air domain will look like in the future are also notably evolving.
“Against a pacing challenge, the current Joint Warfighting Concept already assumes that, in heavily contested airspace, air superiority can be achieved only episodically through pulsed operations,” according to an Air Force report released on Jan. 13 detailing a vision for what the service should look like by 2050. “Penetrating bombers will still have utility for nuclear deterrence, but large numbers of penetrating bombers escorted by fighters capable of penetrating heavily defended airspace will have limited utility, especially given the potential availability of cost-effective, stand-off and loitering weapons.”
Scuttlebutt And Other Voices
Just in the three weeks since the two aircraft first broke cover, new rumored details and useful analyses have emerged or otherwise come to our attention. Much of the former is totally unconfirmed, but how and when some of it surfaced is of interest and worth presenting considering the vacuum of hard facts surrounding these aircraft at this time. But just take the rumors part with a grain of salt.
Purported specifications for the ‘J-36’ notably appeared on Chinese military forums weeks before the design made its public debut. Though totally unconfirmed, the details do align in many respects with what we’ve seen of the jet so far, including a mention of the unusual three-engine configuration. They also match up with our assessments, especially when it comes to high performance (maximum speed of at least Mach 2.5 and supercruise capable), range (1,864 miles/3,000 kilometers), fuel capacity (44,000 pounds/20,000 kilograms), and ordnance (up to 10 tons, including eight to 16 air-to-air missiles or four to eight air-to-surface missiles).
What we’ve seen so far of the J-36’s design is also in line with desirable characteristics for a notional next-generation combat jet outlined in a research paper that Dr. Wang Haifeng, chief designer at Chengdu, is said to have published in China last year. Wang is now also purported to be the lead designer behind the J-36, specifically. The paper puts emphasis on performance balanced for both penetration and maneuverability, all-aspect low-observability, a propulsion system that can provide significant electrical power for onboard mission systems, a large ordnance payload, and a capable sensor and electronic warfare suite. Also mentioned is advanced control surface configurations and thrust vectoring, some of which reflect visible design traits on the J-36. There is a discussion about the potential for adaptive cycle propulsion in the future, as well, which makes sense as we noted earlier.
There are also unconfirmed claims circulating that Wang discussed the J-36 after its public debut on an apparently well-known talk show in China wherein he re-emphasized the importance of electrical power generation above all else when it comes to the jet’s propulsion system. He is also said to have stressed that ‘fighter’ is a misnomer when describing the aircraft, which will be capable of performing a much more diverse array of missions. This aligns with the aforementioned understanding the aircraft will have significant command and control capabilities, including when it comes to overseeing uncrewed aircraft and other capabilities we laid out earlier.
Wang had previously disclosed the start of initial research and development work on a 6th generation fighter concept in an interview published through a Chinese social media account associated with the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), Chengdu’s state-run parent company, back in 2019. At that time, Chengdu’s chief designer said he expected the program to yield real results by 2035.
Screenshots claiming to show a different Chinese research paper, which might be related to the other advanced stealth jet that emerged last week, have also been circulating online. Interestingly, they seem to suggest that the design is not that maneuverable, being less so than a fully laden third-generation F-4E Phantom II. This fits roughly with our analysis. At the same time, even if the paper is real, without the complete context, the validity of its conclusions cannot be fully assessed.
“Consensus on the Chinese language grapevine that predicted this aircraft [the J-36] (as well as a variety of other past projects, including the J-20, J-35/A, J-15T, 002 and 003 aircraft carriers, 075 and 076 amphibious assault ships, among many others), describe it as the intended next-generation air superiority aircraft for the PLA,” Rick Joe, who has long tracked Chinese military developments, wrote in a piece The Diplomat published on Dec. 30. “Some papers on the nature of future air combat have been published by senior aerospace engineers at CAC, though they are predictably general in scope and do not reveal specific or sensitive information in relation to the J-36.”
“The J-36 may resemble how one might envision a ‘modern stealthy, theater striker’ (such as past concepts of a ‘FB-22‘) to look rather than a traditional ‘fighter aircraft.’ However, this is not unexpected for an air superiority aircraft for the next generation,” he added. “Indeed, the term ‘fighter’ might well become anachronistic.”
” … ‘fighter’, ‘bomber’ and ‘strike’ definitions are getting less clear. Most Boeing F-15s, nominally fighters, have been built as strike aircraft, and the fighter-derived Sukhoi Su-34 is another step down the same path,” long-time aviation journalist Bill Sweetman noted in a piece for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute published on Jan. 3. “Designed against air and land threats, the J-36 is even larger than the Su-34. Its size and flight performance put it into its own category, for which there is no name. Maybe ‘airborne cruiser’ will catch on.”
“I think we are seeing not only a huge surprise here — especially with two designs being almost simultaneously unveiled from SAC and CAC — and I think it is too hasty to say that these are sixth generation fighters,” Chinese aviation expert Andreas Rupprecht also shared on social media this week. “I think we are at the point where we can say that China has shown us for the first time its own idea of air combat and combat aircraft of a new generation for the future, which differs from that of the West.”
It is “difficult to assess” what the future risk may be of China pulling ahead of the United States when it comes to 6th generation combat jet development “given that the aircraft element of [the] U.S. [Air Force’s] Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) effort is highly classified and details are simply not available,” David Deptula, dean of the Air & Space Force Association’s (AFA) Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, told TWZ. “That said, back in 2020, Dr. Will Roper, then the head of Air Force acquisition, confirmed that a prototype [demonstrator] of that aircraft had flown. Given that was five years ago, the U.S. is probably still ahead of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in this regard.”
Still, “there are concerns about China’s progress especially in light of the self-imposed delays in U.S. advanced combat aircraft development as we recently observed with the pause in the U.S. next-generation air dominance aircraft effort. While the CCP is increased military spending, U.S. military spending is decreasing. In particular, the U.S. Air Force is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history and is planned to get even older, smaller, and less ready over the next five years,” Deptula, who is also a retired Air Force lieutenant general, added. “If this trajectory is not reversed, the consequences for future U.S. military operations will be disastrous. Part of recovering from the Air Force’s combat aircraft inventory nose dive is to proceed immediately with the development of NGAD — both the penetrating combat aircraft [crewed 6th generation jet] and the collaborative combat aircraft [drones].”
Parting Shots
We will save our analysis on the future of NGAD in relation to these new Chinese advanced tactical jet revelations for another day, but the fact that China has built an aircraft concept that some of us have been begging the Air Force to procure for many years is telling.
The need for a heavy tactical platform that features high survivability and has a very large combat radius is fairly logical for China, but for the U.S., which would be fighting far from its home turf, it has been an outright gap that has been highlighted in a burning neon glow for many years. Meanwhile, the U.S. bypassed investing into such a platform and instead poured huge sums of money into traditional fighter concepts that have notoriously shallow endurance and which depend totally on having tankers within hundreds of miles of their target areas. This was occurring as potential enemies’ anti-access bubbles ballooned and the threat to support aircraft like tankers and airborne early warning and control aircraft became undeniable.

During this same period, the powers that be totally buried the unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) revolution — a whole other bizarre and potentially scandalous story of its own which you can read about in our 2016 feature. These advanced, stealthy drones featured ranges far in excess of their manned counterparts. Now, just as we argued for in great detail eight years ago, the bandaid solution to this bizarre and hugely expensive mismatch between America’s tactical airpower inventory and the realities of the future battlespace is a stealth tanker. Many laughed at the idea then and derided our case for its unfortunate necessity. That is no longer the case and it’s now a top imperative of the USAF.

This is all very unfortunate and clearly the USAF is scrambling to decide what it can do to get its huge fleet of existing fighter aircraft within striking distance of Chinese targets while also keeping far enough ahead as it continues to lose ground to China’s race for technological parity. It’s not a good situation and China is clearly happy that this is indeed the case as they are openly flaunting their progress to the world. Hence the gift that was left for us on the morning following Christmas in the form of a major military aerospace flex.
Whether the USAF needs an NGAD tactical manned jet now or not we will address deeper in the future, but the reality is they needed it long ago and instead kept arming themselves with aircraft ill-suited for a near-peer fight in the Pacific — the same place they constantly declared their future strategic gaze would fall on. China, on the other hand, appears to be stacking potential capabilities high and fast, which makes countering them all that more challenging. There is so much development going on that placing limited chips on one counter-strategy that will take years to realize is a very tall and somewhat frightening order. We are seeing exactly this indecisive struggle play out within the USAF with NGAD now.
The bottom line is that momentum is on China’s side, regardless of what some very confident sounding generals may say. And even that really isn’t the case anymore. The brass is openly spooked too. Still, this appears to remain a marginally manageable issue for the Air Force, but if the trend line continues, it won’t stay that way, and that breaking point is coming faster than many once thought it would.
Underestimating China has been a long practice of the DoD and the defense punditry. Flashbacks of the J-20’s emergence are clear in my head, as well as the poor analysis by many with the biggest platforms at the time. It too was called out to be a ‘deep striker’ then, not a heavy fighter that would target vulnerable support assets as I laid out at the time. It didn’t take long for that tone to shift, but we are seeing that again possibly with many claiming the larger of the two aircraft is a regional bomber aircraft.

The J-20 appeared 14 years nearly to the day prior to the these two new jets in a very similar ‘pseudo leak’ fashion. That was a major shock to some, and still, nearly a decade and half later, similar reactions occurred for these new aircraft. I think this is more about denial of the true changing nature of the global balance of military might than it is about the aircraft themselves, which are very intriguing, but hardly represent an unthinkable technological leap.
And while far from a ‘Sputnik moment’ some all too often declare events like this one to be, these aircraft — still the better part of a decade, at best, from becoming an operational threat — are the latest and possibly the most potent reminder that the days of American air supremacy are numbered, if they are not already history, at least to a degree.
The insidious nature of China’s slowly accelerating degradation of America’s military aerospace technological supremacy is harder to act on than one epiphany-like moment. And that may be a feature, not a bug for Beijing. We have become accustomed to the slow erosion of America’s military advantage, and now that it’s late in the game, the balance of power is shifting more rapidly. As a result, reacting with any real clarity and confidence within a system that hasn’t adapted to this new paradigm is a real challenge.
So no, a ‘Sputnik moment’ this is not, but I think it’s fair to say the last 14 years, from J-20 to J-36, has been a ‘Sputnik decade and a half.’
Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com