The Russian missile at the center of an unprecedented strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro earlier today has been identified by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as an alleged new weapon, named Oreshnik. After the strike, the missile had been widely — although not conclusively — identified as the RS-26 Rubezh. Development work on this mysterious strategic weapon system was supposedly halted in 2018, although the Pentagon now states that whatever missile was used today in Dnipro was based on the RS-26, suggesting the design was revived at least to a degree, and has now been used in combat.
You can read our initial report on the Dnipro missile strike here, as well as our analysis of Putin’s claims around the Oreshnik — described as a medium-range or intermediate-range “hypersonic” missile — here.
Note: The missile shown at the top of this story is the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile, a weapon on which the RS-26 is widely assessed to be based.
First off, it’s worth recalling that the RS-26 is widely viewed as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a class of weapon that has a range of somewhere between approximately 1,860 and 3,410 miles — based on the ranges it achieved in tests. However, Russia has previously described it as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a type of weapon that can hit targets at more than around 3,410 miles.
The reason for this discrepancy likely lies primarily in Russia having sought to remain within the limits of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which outlawed ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,410 miles). The INF collapsed in 2019.
However, it could explain why the Ukrainian military initially reported that the missile that struck Dnipro was an ICBM — a claim that many Western officials subsequently denied, pointing instead to the RS-26 or an RS-26 derivative.
Regardless, there is now a growing consensus that the missile used was a conventionally armed IRBM based on the RS-26. The launch site appears to have been Kapustin Yar, roughly 500 miles from the target.
As for the RS-26, this is a solid-fueled, road-mobile missile that has been described in the past as a smaller derivative of the RS-24 Yars ICBM, although the exact relationship is unclear. Development of the RS-26 began around 2008 by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. The missile is reportedly around 39 feet long and has a diameter of just under six feet.
A first, unsuccessful test launch occurred at Plesetsk in September 2011.
In a second test in May 2012, Russia demonstrated that the RS-26 could reach an intercontinental range, although it was widely assumed that this was only achieved with a light payload or no payload at all.
Subsequent tests strongly indicated the missile couldn’t fly beyond intermediate ranges with an actual warhead, which would have put it in contravention of the INF had it been fielded operationally prior to 2019.
Amid this controversy, Russia had officially pulled the plug on the potentially treaty-busting RS-26 in 2018. In March of that year, only weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned it in a provocative speech, Russia reportedly decided to shelve the development of the Rubezh, dropping it from the state armament plan for 2018 to 2027. Instead, the country would focus on fielding the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle weapon. Previously, Putin had stated that the RS-26 would also serve as the primary launch vehicle for Avangard.
A Russian Ministry of Defense video reportedly showing Avangard prototypes and a computer-generated depiction of its operational concept.
“The Avangard was included in the [state armament plan] program’s final version as more essential to ensure the country’s defense capability,” a Russian defense industry source said, according to state-run media outlet TASS. “All the work on the Rubezh and the Barguzin [rail-mobile ICBM] was put on hold until the end of 2027. A decision on the work’s resumption will be made after the current armament program is fulfilled.”
Without the RS-26, the Avangard has instead been fielded in a silo-based form loaded onto repurposed rocket boosters from old UR-100N UTTKh ICBMs. The hypersonic boost-glide vehicle may also become a payload option for the silo-launched RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, which has had a troubled development. There is clear evidence that a new RS-28 test launch earlier ended in disaster.
It was unclear exactly why Russia abandoned the RS-26, although it may simply have been a financial decision, especially with competition from a range of other advanced strategic capabilities the country is also pursuing. Cost concerns were certainly raised in the TASS reporting in 2018.
“It was initially planned to include both the Avangard and the [RS-26] Rubezh in the state armament plan,” the anonymous defense industry source told TASS. “It became clear later that funds would not suffice to finance both systems at a time.”
There may have been other issues, as well. After all, prior to being mentioned again in 2018, there had been scant official mention of the RS-26 at all for years. The Kremlin was supposed to demonstrate the system to arms control inspectors from the United States first in 2015 and then in 2016, but both of these inspections were missed.
However, in a 2021 report, the Pentagon stated that, despite the reports in the Russian press, work on the RS-26 and testing of associated equipment continued at least into 2018.
With the demise of INF and the deepening tensions between Russia and NATO, it could be that Moscow has revisited the RS-26, perhaps in the form of the Oreshnik, although there is no evidence that either missile has so far been operationally deployed.
Asked for his reflections on the Dnipro strike, and prior to the Oreshnik disclosure, Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher in the WMD Program at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), told TWZ that the missile used could have been an RS-26 — employed on an experimental basis — or perhaps some new type of missile in the same class. If that were the case, the new missile, Oreshnik or otherwise, would likely be very similar to the RS-26, according to Podvig’s assessment.
As to the likelihood of Russia having returned to developing IRBMs, more generally, Podvig says it’s “entirely possible” that Russia might have revived the RS-26 program. “I wouldn’t be surprised if there was some effort to create a missile that would be kind of similar to RS-26, or SS-20 and things like that. I would not be surprised if design bureaus started putting together a project of that kind,” he added.
There is also the possibility that, if a version of the RS-26 was used, this was simply a case of using up one of the non-operational or even prototype rounds in a combat mission, albeit now rebranded as Oreshnik. The combination of range to target (roughly 500 miles), the ability to evade Ukrainian air defenses, and the powerful signaling may simply have been too tempting for Russia.
At the same time, using an IRBM of any kind for an operational strike will also provide Russia with very valuable information. After all, no ICBM or IRBM has ever been used in combat before.
While the precise identity of the missile used remains a mystery for now, it’s also unclear what kind of payload it was carrying.
When it was developed, the RS-26 was expected to carry either a single nuclear warhead or a nuclear multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload — both options were tested in 2013. The Avangard was, for a while, also seen as an RS-26 payload. Clearly, the missile that targeted Dnipro was either conventionally armed or perhaps, unarmed.
Videos of the strike show what appears to be six warheads hurtling toward the ground, consistent with MIRVs.
Podvig told us that an unarmed RS-26 (or similar IRBM) is “not entirely impossible,” but also raised the possibility of the missile being fitted with small explosive warheads. There is also the potential that the missile was carrying decoys or a combination of small conventional warheads and decoys.
A conventionally armed IRBM is an interesting proposition and it’s not clear if this would have been developed specifically for this strike, or for use in Ukraine more generally, or if it might reflect a broader interest in Russia to field conventional versions of its strategic missiles.
Russia is not known to have looked at developing conventionally armed IRBMs/ICBMs, although, in the past, TWZ has looked at the potential arguments for doing just that — albeit in the case of Israel.
Amid a worsening crisis involving Iran, we examined the possibility of Israel launching an attack using a conventionally armed version of its Jericho IRBM — best known as a launch vehicle for the Israeli nuclear deterrent.
The same arguments could apply to Russia, which might want to make an extremely powerful show of force in the hope of signaling to the West that it should not become more deeply involved in the war in Ukraine. This is especially true for deterring the U.S. and its partners from allowing expanded targeting for its donated weapons inside of Russian borders.
Tellingly, soon after the United States and other allies last week allowed Ukraine to launch long-range missiles into Russia, officials in Moscow warned that they might use a weapon never previously employed on Ukrainian territory.
Using a conventionally armed IRBM may well be a response to that decision by the relevant Western powers. Not only is such a missile immune to Ukrainian air defenses but it also delivers a very robust message and one that will resonate across Europe. After all, this is a missile that can reach targets anywhere in the continent and which, on another day, could be topped with a nuclear warhead.
If the missile was indeed filled with decoys and perhaps didn’t even carry highly-destructive conventional warheads, that would very much point to signaling being the desired effect.
On the other hand, a high-explosive warhead would be extremely destructive and might well be selected for a particularly important or heavily defended target. Should Russia want to target hardened or buried command centers and other key fortified sites in Ukraine, then it might call upon the same types of missiles again — provided they are available in sufficient numbers.
Even demonstrating such a capability is significant, since Ukraine’s air defenses mean that Russia could use such missiles to strike anywhere in the country with impunity. Again, if a conventional warhead can be used in this way, the implications of using a nuclear warhead become obvious.
Russian war planners would have to weigh all this up against the possibility that Ukraine and NATO might misconstrue an incoming conventionally armed IRBM as a nuclear one. However, it should be recalled that all of the ballistic and cruise missiles launched against Ukraine so far by Russia also have the capability to carry nuclear payloads. As we suspected, it is now widely understood that Russia warned the U.S. of its intended strike by a conventionally armed strategic weapon prior to launch.
Ultimately, we will need to wait for more evidence to determine the relationship between the RS-26 and the Oreshnik.
It seems certain, however, that Russia has launched an unprecedented attack — and one that does not have a historical parallel.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com