--- title: "Navy’s SM-6 Missile Used In Combat: Report" date: "2024-02-01" modified: "2024-02-01" authors: - name: "Thomas Newdick" job_title: "Staff Writer" link: "https://www.twz.com/authors/thomas-newdick.md" url: "https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-sm-6-missile-used-in-combat-report" categories: - "Arleigh Burke Class" - "Around The Globe" - "Destroyers" - "Maritime Surface-To-Air Missiles" - "Middle East" - "Naval Munitions" - "Navies" - "News & Features" - "Red Sea" - "Sea" - "SM-6" - "Terrorism" - "U.S. Navy" - "Yemen" --- # Navy’s SM-6 Missile Used In Combat: Report ![STANDARD MISSILE-6, SM-6 LAUNCH]() *SM-6 U.S. Navy* The Pentagon is said to have confirmed for the first time the use of the U.S. Navy’s [SM-6 missile]() in the ongoing campaign [against missiles and drones]() launched by the Iran-backed Houthi militants targeting shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. If the SM-6 was indeed employed, it would be the first known use of this surface-to-air missile in combat. As we have [discussed in the past](), the SM-6 offers some unique capabilities, including defense against incoming ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight, which appears to have been the case on this occasion. An unnamed U.S. defense official told *Fox News* that an SM-6 was successfully fired against a [Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile]() (ASBM) in the Gulf of Aden yesterday. The SM-6 — or Standard Missile-6 — was said to be launched by the [*Arleigh Burke* class]() destroyer USS *Carney* (DDG-64), a warship that has already seen plenty of action [engaging Houthi threats](), since the Hamas attack on Israel [last October 7]() triggered a wider conflict in the region. https://twitter.com/Liz_Friden/status/1752810828309332030 While it remains possible, even likely, that the USS *Carney* and other U.S. Navy warships have employed the SM-6 on previous occasions during the ongoing crisis, the U.S. Department of Defense has not formally acknowledged it. After all, since October 19, the *Carney* alone has intercepted at least 38 Houthi drones and anti-ship missiles[ (a mixture of ballistic and cruise types)](), according to CENTCOM media releases. https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1750565792523948165 To date, however, the only type of ship-launched missile confirmed to have been employed by the U.S. Navy in the course of these operations is the less advanced and cheaper [SM-2](). ![]() *The USS *Carney* fires an SM-2 surface-to-air missile at a Houthi threat while sailing in the Red Sea on October 19, 2023. *U.S. Navy** Details of the latest engagement were provided by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), [as we reported last night](), although the missile type(s) involved were not initially mentioned. The command said the USS *Carney* shot down a Houthi ASBM at 8:30 PM local time before shooting down three “Iranian drones” in the warship’s vicinity at 9:10 PM local time. It’s unclear if those drones were actually operated by Iran, or were Iranian-designed but used by the Houthis. Soon after, CENTCOM announced a new round of U.S. strikes against a Houthi drone site in Yemen. https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1752876704295465243 As for the SM-6, *The War Zone* has discussed this highly flexible missile in the past. As multi-purpose weapons, [the Block I and Block IA]() versions currently in use can be employed against a wide variety of aerial threats. It also has a secondary capability against ground and [surface targets](). The SM-6B Block IB variant, which [is currently in development](), is expected to offer hypersonic speed itself and therefore have greater capabilities against hypersonic threats, and increased range. ![]() *An SM-6 round is loaded into a specialized container at the Raytheon Redstone Missile Integration Facility for delivery to the U.S. Navy. *Raytheon** The SM-6 can also be used within the [Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) package](), which allows targeting information to be received from other offboard sources. The Navy [long ago demonstrated the ability]() of ships to engage targets they cannot directly ‘see’ with their own sensors, using SM-6 missiles with the help of data provided by aircraft flying above. Meanwhile, carrier-based E-2 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft — an important CEC asset — are known to be supporting anti-Houthi operations, and aircraft have also shot down cruise missiles in the course of the current campaign. We don’t know the extent to which this kind of networking is being used, but we certainly know this is a multi-layered effort. For now, it’s also unclear exactly how the engagement of the ASBM played out, or even how many SM-6s might have been used to bring it down. What may be critical, however, is the fact that the SM-6 is capable of engaging ballistic missiles — including ASBMs — in addition to separate re-entry vehicles and, in some instances, [more novel hypersonic threats](), and all in the *terminal* stages of their flight. This Sea-Based Terminal capability, as the Pentagon describes it, was introduced to the SM-6 under the [Dual I ]()program. ![]() *A diagram of the SM-6, which is alternatively designated RIM-174 Standard ERAM (Extended Range Active Missile), shows how it makes use of components from other missiles. *Missile Defense Agency** The SM-6’s seeker and terminal guidance electronics leverage technology developed for the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile ([AMRAAM]()). However, the legacy semi-active radar homing capability from the Standard Missile family is also retained. Therefore, as well as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase of flight, the SM-6 can still be used against anti-ship cruise missiles and all types of aircraft. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OU1pUyIzTw In contrast, the SM-3 is a [dedicated ballistic missile interceptor]() that can engage intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), as well as hit shorter-ranged ballistic missiles in the middle portion of their flight. This is known as [mid-course intercept]() capability. However, the SM-3 is not necessarily able to intercept certain shorter-range ballistic missiles, which fly at lower altitudes, and which could include ASBMs. ![SM6 Launch Valiant Shield]() *The *Arleigh Burke* class destroyer USS *Fitzgerald* (DDG-62) launches a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) as part of a joint ballistic missile defense exercise. *U.S. Navy* USN* While we don’t know what kind of ASBM was involved in the incident yesterday, the Houthis operate a wide range of ASBMs and quasi-ASBMs, including some converted from old Soviet-era [SA-2 Guideline]() surface-to-air missiles. Most are of Iranian design, with the largest being the Asef, roughly 30 feet long and derived from the Fateh-313 short-range ballistic missile. As we have [discussed in the past](), most Houthi ASBMs are firmly at the low end of the capability spectrum, meaning they fly at lower peak altitudes and lower speeds. In the past, this may have allowed the Navy to tackle them using SM-2 variants, with their limited terminal ballistic missile intercept capability. ![]() *Asef anti-ship ballistic missile on parade in Yemen in 2022. *via X** It remains unclear why the far more advanced and expensive SM-6 was called upon yesterday, but this weapon has previously demonstrated its ability to intercept short-range and medium-range ballistic missile targets in their terminal phase, as you can read about [here](). Perhaps not surprisingly, there has been plenty made of the discrepancy in cost between [a single SM-6 missile ]()and a Houthi ASBM. ![]() *The destroyer USS *John Paul Jones* (DDG-53) launches an SM-6 during a live-fire test of its Aegis weapons system, on June 19, 2014. *U.S. Navy** While we don’t know the price tags of the kinds of ASBMs used by the Houthis, [the cost]() of an SM-6 is around $4.2 million. This kind of mismatch is nothing new in today’s conflicts, of course. Other examples include using high-end air defense systems to destroy [one-way attack drones over Ukraine]() or Saudi Arabia’s [efforts]() also [against Houthi drones]() and missiles. Considering the missile is protecting a ship that is worth over $2B and is packed with sailors, the cost to defend it is moot. Moreover, the engagement has demonstrated that the U.S. Navy can respond to the kinds of ballistic missile threats that proliferate around the world. Most notably, [China](), [Iran](), and [North Korea]() are also actively developing increasingly capable weapons in this class. The subclass of ASBMs is a particular worry, with [China’s activities]() in this regard providing new ways for the People’s Liberation Army to engage large maritime targets, such as aircraft carriers, over great distances. The fast-growing need for naval ballistic missile defense, more generally, is something we have discussed at length [only very recently](). The multirole nature and inherent flexibility of the SM-6, including its terminal intercept capability, have made it a critical capability for the foreseeable future. Outside of the Navy, the U.S. Army will also increasingly rely on the SM-6, which it is introducing as part of the Typhon Weapon System. This is a[ ground-based missile launcher]() that can fire both [the multi-purpose SM-6]() and the [Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile](). For the time being, if the report is accurate, the SM-6 has now been combat-proven — critically, against a ballistic missile threat — which will only improve its already impressive credentials. *Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com* ## Author Thomas Newdick is a staff writer at *TWZ*, where he covers military aviation, defense technology, weapons systems, and international security. Based in Berlin, Germany, he reports on conflicts, military modernization efforts, and emerging aerospace technologies around the world, with a particular interest in airpower and its role in contemporary warfare. His reporting is informed by deep expertise in modern and historical airpower, particularly in Europe, with a focus on military aviation, air campaigns, and aerospace developments across the continent and beyond. Over a journalism career spanning more than 25 years, Thomas has become known for making complex defense and aerospace topics accessible to a broad audience. His reporting combines technical expertise, historical context, and a focus on the real-world operational and strategic implications of military developments. ### Author social links [Twitter]()