---
title: "Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time"
description: "The use of a Chinese-made DF-15A missile in Yemen would mark a major development for Riyadh’s shy ballistic missile arsenal. The use of a Chinese-made DF-15A missile in Yemen would mark a major development for Riyadh’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal."
date: "2026-09-14"
modified: "2026-09-14"
authors:
  - name: "Thomas Newdick"
    job_title: "Staff Writer"
    link: "https://www.twz.com/authors/thomas-newdick.md"
url: "https://www.twz.com/news-features/saudi-arabia-appears-to-have-used-its-secretive-stash-of-ballistic-missiles-for-the-first-time"
categories:
  - "Around The Globe"
  - "Land"
  - "Middle East"
  - "News & Features"
  - "Saudi Arabia"
  - "Tactical Ballistic Missiles"
  - "Yemen"
---

# Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time

![Images circulating online show what appears to be debris from a Chinese DF-15-series short-range ballistic missile in Marib. Several open-source accounts have identified the weapon specifically as a DF-15A and suggested that it was launched by Saudi Arabia.](<https://www.twz.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/SAUDI-DF-15A.jpg>)
*via X*

Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s [secretive ballistic missile arsenal](<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/08/saudi-arabia-ballistic-missile-programme/>). Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese [DF-15A](<https://www.twz.com/land/chinas-growing-regional-ballistic-missile-arsenal-a-guide.md>) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.

https://twitter.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2099448801643671585?s=20

It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are [not known to possess](<https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-air-defenses-do-the-houthis-in-yemen-actually-have.md>) any weapons that could have intercepted it.

![](<https://www.twz.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/DF-15A_1.jpg>)
*A screenshot from a video clearly shows the DF-15A name applied on the side of the missile. *via X**

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting [here](<https://www.twz.com/news-features/the-outlook-is-getting-grimmer-by-the-day-for-oil-exports-from-the-red-sea.md>).

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.

https://twitter.com/iraninarabic_ir/status/2099465314110931115?s=20

As you can read about [here](<https://www.twz.com/land/chinas-growing-regional-ballistic-missile-arsenal-a-guide.md>), the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.

![Military vehicles carrying DF-15B ballistic missiles participate in a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on September 3, 2015, to mark the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II. China kicked off a huge military ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II on September 3, as major Western leaders stayed away. AFP PHOTO / GREG BAKER (Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP via Getty Images)](<https://www.twz.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-486261444.jpg>)
*Among the later versions of the DF-15 family is the DF-15B. A more substantial redesign, its most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a [maneuverable reentry vehicle](<https://www.twz.com/31456/u-s-conducts-first-test-of-non-nuclear-ballistic-missile-following-inf-arms-treaty-collapse.md>) (MaRV) warhead. *Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP via Getty Images* GREG BAKER*

China is the only *confirmed* operator of the DF-15 family. There have been [longstanding reports](<https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-15-css-6/>) of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

https://twitter.com/inbarspace/status/2099481944157290645?s=20

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh [secretly obtained](<https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China's%20Reported%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Sale%20to%20Saudi%20Arabia_0.pdf>) DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also [subsequently been linked](<https://www.inss.org.il/publication/china-export/>) to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6gPEBp8Efgg&

Previous losses at the hands of [Houthi ground-based air defenses](<https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-air-defenses-do-the-houthis-in-yemen-actually-have.md>) could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to [give even U.S. airpower a serious run](<https://www.twz.com/air/how-the-houthis-rickety-air-defenses-can-threaten-the-stealthy-f-35.md>) for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

*Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com*

## Author
Thomas Newdick is a staff writer at *TWZ*, where he covers military aviation, defense technology, weapons systems, and international security. Based in Berlin, Germany, he reports on conflicts, military modernization efforts, and emerging aerospace technologies around the world, with a particular interest in airpower and its role in contemporary warfare. His reporting is informed by deep expertise in modern and historical airpower, particularly in Europe, with a focus on military aviation, air campaigns, and aerospace developments across the continent and beyond. Over a journalism career spanning more than 25 years, Thomas has become known for making complex defense and aerospace topics accessible to a broad audience. His reporting combines technical expertise, historical context, and a focus on the real-world operational and strategic implications of military developments.

### Author social links  
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