Turkey’s new electronic warfare jet appears to be moving closer to operational status, with by far the clearest imagery yet of the aircraft emerging in an anniversary video for the Turkish Air Force. The platform is loosely similar to Western standoff electronic attack platforms such as the U.S. Air Force’s EA-37B Compass Call and once again underscores the widening spectrum of defense aerospace products, crewed and uncrewed, as well as weapons and sensors, that Turkey is now producing.
A very brief clip of the HAVA SOJ (Airborne Standoff Jammer) appears in a video published today on the official X account of the Turkish Ministry of Defense. The video was prepared to mark the 115th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Air Force and features various other types, either operated by the service or under development. The footage is embedded below, with the HAVA SOJ appearing at around the 1:39 mark.
The new image shows the HAVA SOJ with its external fairings and antennas, but still unpainted. The aircraft is trailing a cable from the top of its vertical stabilizer, which is likely a trailing cone that is often used for early flight tests of new aircraft conflagrations. An air-data probe, a temporary fixture associated with test work, is fitted to the nose.
A first, very poor quality image of the HAVA SOJ on March 1 of this year, when the aircraft was making a test flight out of the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) facility in Ankara.
Previously, two examples of the aircraft had been noted flying on February 20, with their test sorties appearing on publicly available flight-tracking websites.
Around the late 2000s, Turkey and Aselsan began scheming a homegrown replacement for the Turkish Air Force’s existing standoff jamming capability, based on the Transall C-160 turboprop transport, as seen in the photo embedded below.
With the program taking longer than anticipated, thought was given to fielding an interim aerial standoff jammer, under a program known as Golge (shadow). This would have provided an urgent operational capability with two Global Express-based systems and would have integrated equipment from local and international companies. Negotiations made no progress and the Golge program was terminated in 2017.
The first Canadian-made Bombardier Global 6000 airframes for the HAVA SOJ program were delivered to TAI facilities back in 2019. Ultimately, four conversions are planned. Interestingly, some early graphics associated with the program had depicted the system installed on a Gulfstream platform.
The Global 6000 airframes are receiving mission payloads from Aselsan, which are integrated by TAI. Several official images of the aircraft had appeared before the integration system had taken place, but, since then, the aircraft has been notably camera-shy.
The Turkish Defense Industry Agency (SSB), a government body that manages defense industry in Turkey, and which runs this program, describes the role of the HAVA SOJ as follows:
“Standoff Jamming (SOJ) platforms are high-value assets that suppress adversary air defense radars, disrupt command and control cycles, and interfere with communications by conducting deception and noise jamming from long ranges without entering hostile airspace. By doing so, they create corridors through which friendly air forces can penetrate enemy airspace. The effective employment of these platforms has become an undeniable reality of modern warfare, acting as a force multiplier and generating powerful asymmetric effects.”
As well as jamming systems, the HAVA SOJ will also have a surveillance capability, with electronic support measures (ESM) equipment, and there are also accounts of an onboard radar.
Most of this equipment is housed within large sensor fairings around the fuselage.
As to the specifics of the equipment, few details have been released, but it is known to be based on Aselsan’s Koral/Kara SOJ land-based electronic support/attack suite that is mounted on two heavy-duty vehicles. All of the systems for the jets are being developed in-country.
We know that the primary stated mission for the HAVA SOJ is electronic attack, in the form of both deception and jamming. For this purpose, the aircraft is likely fitted with powerful active electronically scanned array (AESA) antennas, like those used in the land-based Koral/Kara SOJ. These could be used to send out highly focused beams of electromagnetic energy to jam the radars and other radio frequency sensors and emitters in the air, on land, and at sea. This is a capability we have talked about before in relation to the U.S. Air Force’s EA-37B electronic warfare jet. Additionally, these same AESA antennas could be used to trigger cyber attacks, a capability you can read more about here.
Another parallel is found in Australia’s MC-55A Peregrine airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (AISREW) jet, based on the Gulfstream G550 business jet airframe. As we have discussed in the past, the Peregrine is likely a multi-role platform, providing both intelligence collection and electronic attack functions.
In practice, the HAVA SOJ would use its ESM equipment to detect and track enemy radio-frequency emissions. After detecting and geolocating the hostile emitter, its frequency value would be determined. Then, the electronic attack element would be activated, sending out its own emissions to electronically attack that emitter, whether it be via jamming or spoofing. Using its AESAs, with its fast-scanning capability, the jet would be able to make pinpoint attacks, not just barrage jamming, and also execute these attacks against multiple emitters of different types and at various ranges simultaneously.
This kind of capability has a clear application against air defense systems and command and control nodes, as the SSB points to. However, it is also able to degrade, deny, and disrupt some kinds of adversary communications, causing havoc in the enemy’s data-sharing architecture and command-and-control system, and reducing adversary commanders’ ability to make effective decisions and share them. And, in peacetime, the aircraft would be able to conduct surveillance intelligence work, helping to build up an electronic order of battle (EOB) on opposing forces, which would be of high value to NATO.
Interestingly, the wingtip pods on the HAVA SOJ look a lot like those found on the EA-18G Growler, as part of its AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming System Receiver system, which includes radar warning receiver (RWR), electronic support measures (ESM), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) functionality.
While designed to work from outside hostile airspace, there have been increasing questions about the ability of specialized aircraft like these to survive against more capable air defenses, with the threat of long-range anti-air missile systems only set to grow.
With regard to the long ‘canoe’ fairing under the fuselage, these are similar to that which appears on the U.S. Army’s ME-11B HADES and the Royal Air Force’s now-retired Sentinel R1s, both also based on the Bombardier Global Express. In these applications, the ‘canoe’ houses a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) radar. SAR imagery consists of highly detailed ground maps, while GMTI functionality can spot and track moving vehicles on the ground, regardless of cloud cover, smoke, dust, or other obscurants. If a similar radar was installed in the HAVA SOJ, it would confer a powerful intelligence-gathering capability, but we cannot say for sure. It is also possible that AESA arrays on the jet that are primarily used to support the electronic attack mission can also perform some SAR/GMTI and other radar functions. It’s also worth noting this aircraft actually has two ventral fairings, which could feature separate arrays.
Finally, the aircraft features two large dorsal SATCOM enclosures on its spine. This would allow for the data this aircraft collects to be distributed anywhere in near-real time. In addition, the aircraft will clearly feature an impressive communications suite for supporting line-of-sight communications and data sharing as well, which will be critical for working as a force multiplier for the Turkish Air Force.
When Aselsan was awarded the contract for its part of the HAVA SOJ program in 2018, it was planned that the first would be delivered to the Turkish Air Force in 2023. That deadline has clearly been missed, hardly uncommon for a program of this technological complexity.
Bearing in mind Turkey’s success in finding customers for its defence products, the HAVA SOJ could also attract substantial foreign interest, with Pakistan having been identified as a possible opportunity in the past.
Aselsan has also entered a joint venture with Taqnia in Saudi Arabia, with the aim of promoting a version of the HAVA SOJ known as Kasih.
For export customers, the mission suite installed in the HAVA SOJ, like other Turkish military equipment, would not be subject to the restrictions imposed by the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) guidelines, which can limit the transfer of defense and military technologies and services — especially the more sensitive ones — to certain countries. Even among NATO operators in Europe, the HAVA SOJ will likely provide an unmatched set of capabilities. With air defenses becoming more capable, even among lower-end foes, the need for high-end electronic attack capabilities is only growing.
While many questions remain about the exact capabilities of the HAVA SOJ, the aircraft’s increasingly frequent appearances suggest the long-delayed program is entering a more mature phase. As Turkey continues to invest heavily in indigenous technologies, the HAVA SOJ is set to become one of the more significant force multipliers in the Turkish Air Force’s inventory, providing a valuable standoff capability, including against modern integrated air defense networks.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com